Truth Hounds is a team of human rights specialists that has been documenting and investigating international crimes in situations of armed conflict since 2014. The organisation’s activities are aimed at establishing justice for the victims of international crimes and preventing their commission.

On 21 March 2022, between 13:00 and 13:30 EET (UTC+2), Russian forces carried out an airstrike on civilian objects in Mykolaiv. Two aerial bombs struck the Inhul Hotel and the grounds of Mykolaiv Regional Psychiatric Hospital № 1.

On 20 May 2022, Truth Hounds took part in joint investigative activities with representatives of the National Police and the Mykolaiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, documenting the site of the strike. Based on information collected at the scene, open-source data, additional information from the investigation, and the results of their own investigation, the organisation’s analysts were able to conclude that this attack featured all of the characteristics of a war crime and identify its perpetrators. 

1. DETERMINING THE TYPE OF WEAPON

In the course of the investigation, Truth Hounds documenters relied on photo and video materials taken at the site where the attacks were committed. Thanks to aerial photography captured with the assistance of a Mavic J3 quadcopter, Truth Hounds field researcher were able to obtain a complete picture of the consequences of the shelling, obtain new material evidence, establish additional details of the incident, and consequently arrive closer at determining the type of ammunition used in the attack. This formed a basis for further investigation and the identification of the alleged perpetrators.

Thanks to the aerial videography, the investigators discovered the remains of the braking parachute of the ammunition used in the attack. The presence of this element, as shown in the photo below, was documented in both locations investigated; near the destroyed Inhul Hotel and on the site of the psychiatric hospital. These findings helped Truth Hounds investigators and law enforcement investigators to identify the type of ammunition and military equipment that were used to carry out the attack.

Establishing the exact type and nomenclature of the ammunition is often the starting point of an investigation, facilitating the establishing of a further chain of logically connected facts according to the scheme ‘type of ammunition – weapon – military unit’ and, in the end, to arrive at the likely perpetrators.

The basis for ballistic analysis of the detonated projectile is a photo and video of the consequences of the explosion of the ammunition itself, as well as information and physical evidence collected during documentation. The pattern of the ruptures, as well as the nature and extent of the destruction caused by the detonation are indicators for determining the type of ammunition.

Thanks to the data collected during documentation, it was possible to narrow the field for the researchers and reject a version of events where the shelling of the civilian objects was carried out either by long- or medium-range missiles or by projectiles launched using a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). This, first of all, is evidenced by the point of entry of the projectiles into the target. The shapes of the eruptions from both strikes indicate that the trajectory of the ammunition was strictly vertical with respect to the surface. For cruise missiles and the vast majority of rockets, such an approach is uncharacteristic, with impacts most often occurring at an acute angle relative to a horizontal surface. It is fair to note that ballistic missiles (Iskanders, for example) also exhibit a vertical point of entry into the surface. However, the possibility of the use of ballistic missiles can be excluded due to the fact that the slings of the brake parachute were found at the attack site, a feature with which was ballistic missiles are not equipped. Rather, such an element is characteristic of a limited range of other types of ammunition. This includes free-fall aerial bombs and certainly MLRS projectiles, namely: illumination, cluster, and so-called ‘mountain’ rockets [1]. However, the configuration of the craters, theconsequences of the explosions (significant scale of destruction and the absence of cluster submunitions at the strike sites), as well as the fact that the attack was carried out in broad daylight, disprove a version of events in which these types of MLRS projectiles were employed to carry out the attack. Consequently, the most probable version of events seems to be that Russian troops made use of free-fall aerial bombs dropped from an aeroplane to carry out the attack on the Inhul Hotel and the psychiatric hospital.

The Russian Air Force is armed with a wide variety of aerial bombs of various types and nomenclatures [2]. The fact of the presence of a braking parachute in the bomb design, as well as the circumstances of the use of this type of ammunition on that particular day, at that time, and the consequences of the detonation of the projectile on the surface all help to significantly narrow the list of ammunition types that could plausibly have been used. Taking into account these criteria, it is possible to immediately reject the use of the following types of aerial bombs: anti-ship bombs (anti-submarine weapons), incendiary and volumetric detonating bombs (the same as thermobaric bombs), and cluster bombs of various types designed for various purposes (single cluster bombs and KMGU bombs, among others). Similarly, aerial bombs with an indicator greater than 1000 (this indicator almost always corresponds to the mass of the ammunition itself) fall outside the focus of the investigation, since the destruction from the detonation of such bombs of any type and nomenclature significantly exceeds that observed as a result of the explosions in Mykolaiv on 21 March 2022.

The presence of a braking parachute further narrows the range of aerial bombs that could potentially have been used, effectively reducing it to three: FAB-250 SH (L) or (N), FAB-500 SH (L) or (N), and the concrete-breaking modification of the BetAB. The “SH” indicator in the name of the first two bombs stands for “assault” and is a cross-type indicator used for all ammunition of this type, precisely indicating the presence of a braking parachute. A version of events by which the attack was carried out using a modified BetAB aerial bomb is unlikely since the design of concrete-piercing bombs, in addition to a parachute, would imply the presence of an accelerator that enables the bomb to penetrate a building or sink into the ground to a depth of 5 m or more, with detonation occurring subsequently. At the same time, the nature of the destruction and the contour of the hole on the roof of the hotel, as well as the clear cone-shaped crater on the hospital grounds, indicate that detonation occurred on the surface rather than from a depth

In order to determine as precisely as possible the type of aerial bombs dropped on Mykolaiv, it is necessary to refer to their technical and tactical characteristics.

As a result of an explosion caused by the warhead of an unguided free-falling aerial bomb, the blast wave forms a cone-shaped eruption, oval in its base. In such a situation, the blast wave diverges diametrically from the centre of the explosion [3].

Freezeframe from a video showing the explosion of an FAB-500 [4].

As the bombs that were dropped on the civilian objects in Mykolaiv were equipped with braking parachutes, they approached their target without the hull being parallel to the surface, instead  descending at a certain angle and only right before the moment of impact did they assume a position perpendicular to the target surface. Therefore, the eruptions from the explosion exhibited a more round shape at the base. This is especially well visible when observing the crater formed on the hospital grounds – where the bomb hit the ground directly and, therefore, at the point of landing, was assumed an almost vertical position with respect to the ground. At the same time, the outline of the hole on the roof of the hotel exhibits a more elongated oval shape, which can be explained by a different angle of entry of the ammunition since the point of impact is some 10 m above the ground.

Check this sentence – it was confusingly written.

Comparative technical and tactical characteristics of FAB-250 and FAB-500

During the detonation of an FAB, a hole is formed, the size of which depends on the properties of the soil, the calibre of the ammunition, and the depth of the explosion. There are, however, weighted average indicators for each of the nomenclatures. For example, when an FAB-250 detonates in loam, a hole with a diameter of 6.8 m and a depth of 1.9 m is formed. When an FAB-500 is used, a hole with a diameter of about 8.5 m and an average depth of 3 m is formed. Both bombs are equipped with a high-explosive warhead, meaning that targets are struck by blast products, hull debris, and an airborne shockwave. In the case of an FAB-250, the mass of the explosive substance is 99 kg and the damage radius reaches 56 m. An FAB-500 aerial bomb can contain up to 223 kg of explosive substance and the damage radius is 80 m.

For ammunition identification, ‘ideal’ tears are always those formed on a flat surface. This allows to estimate the shape of the tear as accurately as possible, thus facilitating the identification of the projectile.

 In the example of the bombing of Mykolaiv, the impact on the hospital is more conducive to analysis since the bomb detonated on a flat surface and not in the structure of a building, as with the case of the Inhul Hotel. From the images below, it can be seen that the crater has the shape of an inverted cone with a slight elongation at the base, the diameter of which is about 6 m. The depth of the hole is approximately 2 m. Given these characteristics, a version of events whereby an FAB-250 was used in the attack on the hospital is the most likely.

Freezeframe from video documentation of the destruction of the hospital grounds [5].
Photo of the tear on the hospital grounds [6].
Photo of the tear on the hospital grounds [7].

The crater formed as a result of the bombing of the hotel building exhibits an oval shape, but is significantly larger than the previous in diameter (by about 10 m). The significant internal destruction which the building sustained and the collapse of its facade reach 8-10 m deep from the level of the hotel roof. Since the bomb did not strike a single dense object, but rather a room with cavities, it is difficult to accurately establish the type of bomb used relying only on the nature of the damage and without additional data (such as elements of the ammunition case, etc.). However, given the fact that the destruction was quite significant and that the residual contour of the hole reaches 10 m in diameter, it can be assumed that the Inhul Hotel could have been struck by a FAB-500 aerial bomb. This assumption is based, in particular, on the fact that Russian Su-34 aircraft can carry various FABs (250 and 500) at the same time to perform a single combat mission [8]. For example, an Su-34 downed in Chernihiv carried both unguided FAB-250 and FAB-500 at the same time [9].

Freezeframe from a video showing the destruction of the Inhul Hotel [10].
Photo of the destroyed facade of the Inhul Hotel [11].

2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERY

In order to narrow down the list of probable perpetrators to the furthest possible extent, it is necessary to establish the type of aircraft that could have released the FAB-500Sh that day in Mykolaiv. Standard FAB-500 carriers (including FAB-500Sh[L] and [N]) are Su-24,[12] Su-25,[13] Su-27,[14] Su-30,[15] Su-34,[16] Su-35,[17] and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers,[18] as well as Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft.[19]

We first rejected the likelihood of the use of strategic aviation aircraft to bomb Mykolaiv that day due to the impracticality, low efficiency, and high risks encountered when undertaking such an operation over enemy territory, as well as the fact that Russian forces rarely use such aircraft to release aerial bombs of the ‘500’ nomenclature. Only a few cases of such bombers being equipped with FABs are known, such as during one of the Russian air raids on the Azovstal facility in April 2022. The Russian Air Force dropped an FAB-500 on the grounds of the plant at the same time as a FAB-3000, explaining the use of this type of aircraft.[20] At the same time, for regular combat operations using only bombs of the 500 class, the Russian military usually employ frontline bombers.

The most popular FAB-500 carrier used during the Russian-Ukrainian War is the Su-34. This is evidenced by repeated media reports, including of the fact that the FAB-500SH is included in the arsenal of this aircraft.[21] Analysing the airstrikes against Ukrainian cities that took place in February-March 2022 and were carried out using FAB-500s, it is evident that Russian forces tended to use Su-34s in such cases.[22] Such airstrikes were carried out in Chernihiv,[23] Kharkiv,[24] Izyum,[25] Borodyanka,[26] Okhtyrka,[27] Mykolayiv,[28] and Volnovakha[29] — cities across Ukraine.

The result of an FAB-500 impact at Gagarin Stadium in Chernihiv [30].
The result of an FAB-500 hitting a department store in Okhtyrka [31].
The result of an FAB-500 hitting a residential building in Borodyanka

It is worth noting that there are also known cases of Su-24s and Su-25s being used to drop FAB-500s, but these were isolated incidents and occurred principally along the eastern section of the front.[32] Reports of the use of FAB-500s by Su-35 and Su-30 aircrafts for bombing Ukrainian cities could not be found.

Thus, given the pattern of attacks undertaken using 500-kg FABs, we can assume that, it was most likely a Su-34 that flew out to bomb Mykolaiv that day. Taking account of its tactical and technical characteristics (TTC), this aircraft is a reasonable option for conducting such operations, since it has radio-electronic warfare capacities, capable of interfering with the anti-aircraft missile systems used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and can also perform flights at low altitudes with terrain bending, increasing the chances of breaking through air defences.[33] This gave these aircraft a significant advantage at the beginning of the full-scale invasion when before the Ukrainian Armed Forces had developed advanced air defences.

The Su-34 is a fighter-bomber primarily designed for missile or bomb raids conducted from both high and low altitudes and in all weather conditions. Less than that of strategic aviation aircraft, the maximum weight of the combat load (eight tonnes) makes the Su-34 a highly manoeuvrable bomber with a combat radius of some 1,100 km, capable of bombing objects on enemy territory in a short period of time.

In view of the above, the search and selection for analysis of air bases (possible take-off sites for the military aircraft that struck Mykolaiv on 21 March 2022) was carried out by determing which were home to Su-34 aircrafts at the time of the attack.

The Su-34 aircraft (in its usual modification) has a characteristic bright blue colour (pictured below), by which it can usually be identified. At present, there are significantly fewer Su-34s in black camouflage. These characteristics provide a point of reference for identifying such aircraft in satellite images.

Photo of a blue Su-34 fighter-bomber [34].
Photo of a black Su-34 fighter-bomber [35].

3.THE SEARCH FOR THE PLACE OF DEPARTURE

In order to detect Su-34s at Russian Air Force airfields and bases, satellite photos from Maxar and Planet Lab (using SkySat satellites) were considered, taking into account the time at which the pictures were taken and then selecting for the dates closest to the attack on Mykolaiv. In the analysis, the colour, size, and appearance of identified aircraft were taken into account. However, due to the peculiarities of light transmission and the relatively low resolution of the available photos, conclusions about the number of aircraft observed cannot be considered final and require additional verification.

Partial information about the types and modifications of aircraft in service with individual units of the Russian Air Force is available from a significant number of open sources. At the same time, information on the composition of the aircraft is closely guarded what information is freely available is very approximate.

At the time of the bombing of Mykolaiv on 21 March 2022, there was no continuous open-source monitoring data regarding take-offs and movements of Russian aviation, nor were there any digital resources that could provide such information. Hence, this research did not consider such information. Instead, it made conclusions about possible flight trajectories on the basis of an analysis of a range of other factors. As for resources currently tracking Russian military aircraft, the most notable are: the Monitor,[36] Monitoring,[37] and TLK News Telegram channels,[38] as well as the TJ Twitter account.[39] Full-fledged airspace monitoring focused on the presence of Russian Air Force aircraft appeared on these channels on 28 June 2022.

The basis for the research and the identification of Russian airfields where Su-34s are located was an illustrative map of the military facilities of the Russian Air Force, which shows almost all airfields used for bombing Ukraine. This map is available through open sources.

Map of airfields used by the Russian Federation to bomb the territory of Ukraine, as well as servicing and temporarily deploying military equipment [40].

According to the available information, Su-34s were stationed at a significant number of air bases in the Russian Federation. However, the remoteness of some of them from southern Ukraine would render it impractical to use these airfields for combat missions in the region. Among them, in particular, is the Seshcha base in Bryansk Oblast (home to at least 10 Su-34s),[41] the Voronezh base in Voronezh Oblast (home to at least 10 Su-34s),[42] and the Lypetsk-2 base in Lypetsk Oblast (home to at least 14 Su-34s),[43] and the Chelyabinsk (Shagol) base in  Chelyabinsk Oblast (home to at least five Su-34s)[44], among others.

In order to establish the most likely bases for the take-off of military aircraft in the direction of Mykolaiv, we focused on military airfields in the vicinity, namely in: Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, and Crimea (indicated by a blue oval in the image below).

Airbases in close proximity to Mykolaiv.

Some of these airfields have not received Su-34s since the start of the full-scale invasion. This includes, in particular, the following airfields in the temporarily occupied Crimea:

а) Dzhankoy Airfield (receives helicopters and sometimes Su-24s);[45]
b) Kacha Airfield (receives helicopters);[46]
c) Kirovske Airport (receives other types of aircraft);[47]
d) Gvardiyske Airfield (receives Su-24s and Su-25s, first received five Su-34s in Summer 2022);[48] and
e) Saki Airfield (receives Su-24s, Su-30SMs, and Su-33s)[49].

All these planes can be identified by their appearance in a photo of the military airfield in Saki from 16 March 2022. It shows Su-24s lined up on the tarmac, a row of Su-27s in light camouflage on a diagonal strip, and dark-coloured Su-30SMs in the centre and upper right corner of the picture. If one enlarges the photo, it can be seen that the dark blue planes in the centre of the picture (which at first glance resemble Su-34s) are actually Su-30SMs, which are permanently deployed at this airfield. This is indicated by the camouflage characteristic of the Su-30SM, as well as its general outlines and shape, which are typical of the family of aircraft built as part of the Su-27 project. We can therefore conclude that there are no Su-34s at the Saki airfield.

Saki Airport as shown in a Planet SkySat photo from 16 March 2022 [50].
Saki Airport as shown in a Planet SkySat photo from 16 March 2022 (smaller scale).
A Su-30SM multifunctional fighter [51].

There is publicly available evidence relating to the use of airfields in Crimea as launch points for Russian military aircraft to strike Ukraine, particularly Mykolaiv Oblast. This is what Russian pilots taken prisoner stated themselves during a joint press conference held on 11 March 2022, the date preceding the airstrike on the Inhul Hotel and the psychiatric hospital.[52] Here are some illustrative quotes: “The flight [from the Saki airfield] was carried out to the Nikolaev [Mykolaiv] region, 20 km from Nikolaev [Mykolaiv],” one of the pilots admitted.[53] The second pilot from Crimea added: “The aviation of the Republic of Crimea constantly provided air support to the ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine”.[54] However, the video does not reveal more detailed information about the goals, circumstances, or type of aircraft used.

As for the airfields of Rostov Oblast, the situation is similar:

a) Millerovo Airfield (receives Su-25s, Su-30s, and Su-35s)[55];
b) Taganrog Centre Airfield (receives IL-76)[56]; and
c) Zernograd Airfield (receives helicopters)[57].

Krasnodar Krai also has a considerable number of airfields, but they similarly are not locations to which Su-34s are permanent deployed:

a) Yeisk Airfield (received MiG-29s and Su-33s as of March 2022)[58];
b) Kushchivska Airbase (training base; receives Su-27s, Su-25s, and MiG-29s)[59];
c) Korenovsk Airfield (receives helicopters); and
d) Krymsk Airfield (receives Su-27s, Su-30s, and helicopters).[60]

 

We managed to identify three airfields where a certain number of Su-34 aircrafts are deployed and used for combat missions on the territory of Ukraine. These are the Morozovsk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, and Belbek airfields, detailed analyses of which are provided below.

It is important to pay attention to the situation in the zone of active hostilities during the period in question, since the configuration of the frontline will influence the determination of any hypothetical flight path of aircraft to Mykolaiv. Since the developers of the DeepState resource, whose data reliability is among the highest of such platforms, began to maintain an interactive daily map of combat operations on the territory of Ukraine only from the beginning of April, we used another source of consolidated information about the state of the front at the end of March, namely the “liveuamap.com” resource. As of 21 March 2022, that is, at the time of the attack, the frontline looked like this:

Approximate state of the front on 21 March 2022, according to the Live Universal Awareness Map [61].

Morozovsk Mustang Airport, Rostov Oblast, Russian Federation (Coordinates: 48.3155467320518, 41.79138325509381)

The 559th Bombardment Aviation Regiment of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the Russian Air Force (Military Unit № 75392 of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation) is permanently based at the airfield, which is armed with Su-34s (36 units), which makes up three separate combat squadrons (12 units each).[62] A list of the personnel of this regiment is freely available and is reproduced in Appendex I.[63] The 559th Regiment itself is part of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force.

Emblem of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the Russian Air Force.

Satellite images of the airfield from 21 March 2022 show at least nine Su-34 aircraft at the location.

The central part of Morozovsk Airfield, Rostov Obast. On the left three Su-34 aircraft (two blue and one black) can be seen. On the right, what are probably a Su-24 and a Su-30SM can be seen. Photo from 21 March 2022 [64].
The eastern part of Morozovsk Airfield, Rostov Oblast. The photo shows five Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 21 March 2022 [65].
The northwestern part of Morozovsk Airfield, Rostov Oblast. One 1 Su-34 aircraft can be seen. Photo from 21 March 2022 [66].

Decisive for further research is the fact that in or around February 2022, at least one Su-34 squadron of the 559th Aviation Regiment was moved to the Belbek military airport located in the temporarily occupied Crimea. The exact date of the movement of the aircraft is unknown, but the fact of the redeployment is confirmed in a message from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (hereafter, ‘the GUR of the Ministry of Defence’)[67]. Further, the satellite photos shown above testify to a significant decrease in the number of Su-34s at the Morozovsk airfield. It is clear that the purpose of such redeployment was to provide air support for the conducting of hostilities in southern Ukraine, including attacks on objects in this territory with the aid of unguided aerial bombs. At the same time, the fact of the redeployment of the Su-34s negates the use of the Morozovsk airfield as the airfield used by the Russian Air Force for the air raid on Mykolaiv on 21 March 2021, though Su-34s were there on the day of the attack. Taking into account the security component, the range, and the complex trajectory of the approach, as well as the presence of bombers at air bases closer to Mykolaiv, such a combat sortie would appear to be impractical (see diagram below).

Meanwhile, it was established that aircraft belonging to the 1st Aviation Squadron based at the airfield were used to bomb Kharkiv.[68]

The probable flight path of a Su-34 aircraft from Morozovsk Airfield to Mykolaiv.

Primorsko-Akhtarsk Tonalny Airfield, Krasnodar Krai, Russian Federation (Coordinates: 46.05781631899269, 38.236525490583915)

The 960th Assault Aviation Regiment (Military Unit № 75387), which is part of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force, is stationed at this airfield. The regiment is armed with Su-25s, Su-25UBs, and Su-25SM3 attack aircraft. Open sources reveal information about a certain proportion of the regiment’s personnel.[69] There is also information available regarding the presence of at least 10 Su-34 aircrafts on the territory of the airfield.[70] The same planes were detected on satellite images taken back in February 2022. Since these bombers are not in service with the 960th Assault Aviation Regiment, whose permanent location is Primorsko-Akhtarsk, it can be assumed that they were also transferred from the base in Morozovsk, as both regiments belong to the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force. Hence, as in the Belbek example, the Su-34 aircraft, which have been at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield since February 2022, belong to the aforementioned 559th Bombardment Regiment. In view of the number of aircraft evident in satellite images, another aviation squadron was moved to Primorsk – a total of 12 Su-34 aircraft.

Emblem of the 960th Assault Aviation Regiment.

To detect the Su-34 aircraft at the airfield, we considered satellite images from Maxar (from 13 February 2022) and Planet SkySat (from 6 April 2022), as well as a photo by Planet Lab Inc from the publication ‘Map of 40 airfields from which Russia conducts airstrikes against Ukraine’ by Armyinform — as the closest chronologically to the day of the airstrikes.

Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai. The photo shows 10 Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 13 February 2022 [71].
Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai. Photo from 19 March 2022 [72].
Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai. The photo shows nine Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 6 April 2022 [73].
Probable flight path of a military plane from Primorsko-Akhtarsk to Mykolaiv.

The probability of an attack from this airfield is somewhat higher compared to the Morozovsk airfield. However, it seems illogical to use aircraft from this base for combat sorties aimed at bombing Mykolaiv and other populated areas in southern Ukraine, as – at the time – a separate squadron of Su-34s was already stationed at the Belbek military airfield to perform such operations. In any case, even if the plane that dropped bombs on Mykolaiv on 21 March  2022 took off from the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield, it belonged to the 559th Aviation Regiment of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force.

Belbek Alma Airfield, the temporarily occupied Crimea, Ukraine. (Coordinates: 44.69297287510348, 33.57970208388543)

The 38th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 27th Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Southern Military District, which is armed with various modifications of Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s, is permanently based at the Belbek airfield.[74] According to Ukrainian intelligence, from mid-2021, 12 Su-34s of an unspecified regiment began to be stationed at Belbek. However, as already mentioned above, it is known from the GUR of the Ministry of Defence that it was a Su-34 squadron of the 559th Bombardment Aviation Regiment (Morozovsk) of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force.[75]

After the strikes on the Saki airfield and other bases in Crimea in August 2022, the Russians moved a significant amount of military equipment, including Su-34 aircraft, to airfields deep inside Russia.[76]

Emblem of the 38th Fighter Aviation Regiment.

To detect the Su-34s at the Belbek airfield, we made use of Maxar satellite images (from 6 March 2022) and Planet SkySat (from 21 March 2022 [the day of the attack on Mykolaiv] and 23 March 2022). In the Maxar photo, dated 6 March 2022, at least four Su-34 aircraft with a distinctive bright blue colour can be distinguished. This number may be inaccurate, as it is quite difficult to distinguish all objects on the territory of the airfield due to cloud cover.

Designation of placement of Russian aircraft at Belbek Airfield [77].
Belbek Airfield. At least four bright blue Su-34 aircrafts can be seen. Photo by Maxar dated 6 March 2022 [78].

The rest of the images presented below were taken by Planet SkySat satellites on the exact day of the airstrikes on Mykolaiv – 21 March 2022. It is important to note that these pictures were taken at 13:31 EET, coinciding with the time of the attack on Mykolaiv.

Enlarged photo of Belbek Airfield from 21 March 2022. One bright blue Su-34 is visible.

As for the other aircraft at the airfield, located next to the identifed Su-34s, several dark-coloured aircraft can be seen (six aircraft in the first enlarged photo above). As illustrated at the beginning of this investigation, Su-34 aircraft may also feature black camouflage. In particular, there is confirmation of the deployment of Su-34 aircraft in black camouflage at Belbek. On 15 March 12022, the Russian federal TV channel Zvezda, one of the owners of which is the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, published a story showing how a black Su-34 took off from the Belbek airfield.

Freezeframe from the video by the Zvezda TV channel on 15 March 2022 [80].

Below are photographs of the Belbek  airfield from 23 March 2022 – the most recent available after the date of the Mykolaiv airstrike.

Photograph of Belbek Airfield from 23 March 2022. At least four Su-34s can be seen [81].

At least four Su-34 fighter-bombers are marked in the picture – in their standard bright blue colour. Again, black aircraft can be seen lined up next to each other – in the picture from 21 March, a total of six units are visible.

There is every reason to believe that the black aircraft in the images are also Su-34s. The maximum number of simultaneously photographed Su-34s, both bright blue and black, can be seen in the image from 21 March — a total of 11 such aircraft. The fact that all of them were at the airfield at the exact time of the attack on Mykolaiv is especially important. Considering the deployment of an entire squadron of 12 bombers in Belbek at that time, it can be assumed that as of 13:31 EET on 21 March 2022, one of them was on a sortie in Mykolaiv and dropped bombs on a hotel and a psychiatric hospital.

As for the likely flight path of the planes from the Belbek base to Mykolaiv, an illustration is presented below.

Probable flight path from Belbek Airfield in Crimea to Mykolaiv

It is evident that the flight distance is shorter compared to that from other airfields and, therefore, a combat sortie from this location would be subject to lower security risks. Moreover, on 24 March 2022 (three days after the attack), the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation published a video showing the departure of an Su-34 on a combat mission, with FABs on board. It is highly probably that the video was shot at the Belbek airfield. This is indicated by the weather and climate conditions filmed in the video, which are characteristic of southern Ukraine at this time of year, as well as the particularities of this location.

Two still frames from the video were selected for analysis, combined with a satellite image of the Belbek airfield from 6 March 2022, the closest date to that of the video for which images are freely available. The still images clearly show the earthen barriers that serve as protection against fragments from explosive munitions – they are marked above with red ovals. On the right side of the plane, a certain number of Su-34s can be seen, indicated above by a red rectangle. If one observes the satellite image, the same objects can be observed as in the video, located in the same order and at the same distance from each other. Hence, this video once again proves that at the end of March, there were indeed Su-34 aircraft with FAB-250/500 aerial bombs on board at the Belbek airfield.

Satellite image of Belbek Airport from 21 March 2022, with objects positioned in the same manner as in the freezeframes shown above.

4. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ATTACKERS

As repeatedly noted earlier on, the air raid on Mykolaiv on 21 March 2022 may have involve the pilots and command of one of the three aviation squadrons making up the 559th Bombardment Regiment of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force, permanent located at the airfield in the city of Morozovsk, Rostov Oblast. There is information available from open sources attesting to the fact that after sending a significant number of aircraft to the occupied Crimea and Primorsk-Akhtarsk in February 2022, the 1st Aviation Squadron of said regiment remained at its place of permanent deployment in Morozovsk.[86] In particular, this is evidenced by a video[87] of one of the pilots belonging to the squadron who carried out an air raid on Kharkiv. This means that the 2nd or 3rd Squadron of the regiment was transferred to Crimea, narrowing the search for the alleged perpetrators. A complete list of the personnel of the two indicated squadrons is presented in Appendix I.

It is also possible to count among the probable executors the command of the regiment itself — the persons involved in planning the operation and giving orders. The commander of the regiment is Colonel Vitaly Andriyovych Shishkin.

Colonel Vitaly Andriyovych Shishkin

Below is a detailed explanation of why the 559th Bombardment Regiment is in the spotlight.

As of the end of 2021, not a single Su-34 was stationed at Belbek Airfield. Quite expectedly, since the 38th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which is stationed at Belbek, is not equipped with Su-34s, instead having only Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s in service.

This is confirmed by satellite images of the airfield from 22 November 2021.

Satellite image of Belbek Airfield from 22 November 2021
Satellite image of Belbek Airfield from 22 November 2021

At the same time, three squadrons of Su-34 aircraft were stationed at the Morozovsk airfield – the number that were in service with the 559th Bomber Regiment, stationed at Morozovsk.

The central western section of Morozovsk Airfield on 18 November 2021
The central section of Morozovsk Airfield on 18 November 2021
The eastern section of Morozovsk Airfield on 18 November 2021.

As we can see in the images, there were 30 Su-34 aircraft at Morozovsk (24 in blue camouflage and six in black). Thirty Su-34s constitute two full squadrons and half of a third. Most probably, the other six aircraft were in hangars, on duty, temporarily redeployed, under inspection, or out for repair.

At the same time, in 2021, Belbek received one Su-34 squadron, most likely from Morozovsk. This is evidenced by data from Ukrainian intelligence, presented to the OSCE in Summer 2021. The Russian Federation, under the guise of inspecting its armed forces, transferred one Su-34 squadron to Belbek. After staying there for a certain time, it later returned to its location of permanent deployment.

A photo of Belbek Airfield in the spring of 2021.

At the same time, Morozovsk lacked precisely one Su-34 squadron, according to satellite images from April 2021 (at the time of the supposed ‘inspection of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’).

Morozovsk Airport Airfield from on 16 April 04/16/2021.

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation decided to move this squadron of Su-34s from Morozovsk to Belbek again to support its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. This is confirmed by a statement by the GUR of the Ministry of Defence which states that Belbek housed Su-34s from the 559th Bombardment Regiment based in Morozovsk.[89]

This is also confirmed by satellite images of Belbek and Morozovsk from March 2022.

The central part of the Morozovsk airfield, Rostov Oblast (three Su-34 aircraft can be seen on the left of the photograph [two blue and one black], while what is probably a Su-24 and a Su-30SM can be seen on the right). Photo from 21 March 2022
The eastern part of Morozovsk airfield, Rostov Oblast, showing five Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 21 March 2022.
The northwestern part of the Morozovsk airfield, Rostov Oblast, showing one Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 21 March 2022.

As of 21 March 2022, there were a total of nine Su-34 aircraft out of a typical 36 located at Morozovsk airfield. Meanwhile, there were at least 11 Su-34s at Belbek airfield, as shown in satellite images.

Belbek Aairfield on 21 March 21, 2022. 2 (Aat least 10 Su-34s can be seen
Belbek Airfield on 21 March 2022. At least one Su-34 can be seen

In the first picture shown above, one can observe at least 10 Su-34s, five of which bear black camouflage. Another Su-34 can be seen in the technical and operational part of the airfield. Thus, the photo from that day shows a total of 11 Su-34s. Only one plane is missing from a full squadron, the plane which, according to our assumptions, performed the combat mission in Mykolaiv.

So, both in the spring of 2021 and during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation transferred one squadron of the 559th Bomber Regiment from Morozovsk to Belbek.

The high activity of the regiment did not go unnoticed by Russia’s top authorities. On 17 March 2023, President of Russia Vladimir Putin signed a decree assigning the 559th Bomber Aviation Regiment the honorary title ‘Guards’.

‘For the massive heroism and bravery, resilience, and courage shown by the personnel of the regiment in combat actions for the protection of the motherland and state interests in the conditions of armed conflict, I decree: Assign the 559th Bombardment Aviation Regiment the honorary name “Guards”’ the document reads.[90]

The bombing pattern of the 559th Bombardment Aviation Regiment in Syria

The 559th Bomber Aviation Regiment participated in the bombing of civilian objects during the war in Syria. In particular, there is data on the activity of Su-34s from the regiment during the so-called ‘Operation Vozmezdie’, which lasted from 17 to 20 November 2015.[91] It is known that at least eight Su-34s from the regiment were involved on 20 November, most likely taking off from the Krymsk airfield for the bombing.[92] In general, the Su-34 most often used FAB-500 and FAB-250 bombs, compared to other types of ammunition.[93] In particular, civilians repeatedly managed to film FAB-500Shs landing.[94]

Freezeframe from a video by a civilian in Syria. [95]

The international intelligence community InformNapalm managed to identify specific pilots and navigators of the Su-34s that participated in the commission of war crimes, in particular, Serhiy Valeriyovych Shturbabin and Oleksiy Mykhailovych Chechotkin, who remain the chief navigators of the 559th Bombardment Regiment.[96]

The commander of the regiment at that time was Gennady Stanislavovich Naduda.[97]

Intelligence data from InformNapalm [98].

The flight trajectory and impact

The information available to the investigation does not reveal the exact time at which the explosions rang out, leaving a time range of half an hour — between 13:00 and 13:30 EET. It is therefore impossible to establish their sequence. Hence, there are two versions of events for the entry of the aircraft into the airspace above the city – either from the west or the east. Due to the lack of additional data, both options should be regarded as equally probable, given the equidistant location of the hypothetical target of the attack (a ship repair plant) and the locations of the actual hits (a hotel and a psychiatric hospital) relative to the western and eastern borders of the city. In order to confirm the veracity of the probable direction of entry for the final direct dropping of the aerial bombs, it is necessary to obtain some input data.

Analysis of images captured by Truth Hounds during the documentation mission showed that the tears from the detonation of the aerial bombs at the hotel and the hospital have somewhat different spatial orientations. However, this may be due to the fact that the bombs were dropped with braking parachutes, possibly affecting the spatial locations of the ammunition.

Markings of the orientations of the sinkholes in the Inhul Hotel and on the hospital grounds, plotted on a map of Mykolaiv.

It should be noted that immediately after the attack, there was a report of a third hit – in the park next to the Inhul Hotel.[99] Satellite images show no signs of other aerial bomb hits on 21 March 2022. However, the plane’s likely flight path over Mykolaiv does indeed pass through a large city park. Considering the fact that the Su-34 can drop up to four aerial bombs at a time, the possibility of another bomb striking somewhere in the centre of the city should be investigated.

An imaginary line connecting all three sites, including the shipyard area, as well as passing through the park.

5. DISTANCE TO A PROBABLE MILITARY TARGET

If one marks the locations of aerial bomb strikes in Mykolaiv on 21 March 2022 on a map of the city, it becomes obvious that their location is close to the territory of the shipyard. Since the plant specialises in the construction and repair of ships, by all accounts it could have been a legitimate military target chosen for attack by the Russians. Given the fact that unguided munitions were chosen for the strike, rather than precision weapons, the entire territory of the plant and not any specific point on it could be considered a probable military target.

It is known that as of the end of February 2022, the Mykolaiv Shipyard was operating and repairing equipment.[100]

The grounds of the shipyard according to a cadastral map. [102]
The distance from the Ingul Inhul Hotel to the shipyard is about around 150 m
The distance from the hospital to the shipyard is 272 m

6. ARE THE AIRSTRIKES ON THE INHUL HOTEL AND PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL WAR CRIMES?

Part 1 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) – ‘Violation of the laws and customs of war’ has the following forms of the Actus reus:

‣  Cruel treatment of prisoners of war or civilians;
‣  Expulsion of the civilian population for forced labour;
‣  Looting of objects of national value ​​in occupied territory;
‣  Use of means of warfare prohibited by international law;
‣  Other violations of the laws and customs of war provided for by international treaties, binding consent to which was given by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; and
‣ 
Issuing an order to perform such actions.

The information analysed in this report gives reason to believe that the airstrikes on the Inhul Hotel and the psychiatric hospital bear signs of ‘other violations of the laws and customs of war’ provided for by Article 48  – ‘Basic norms’, Article 51 – ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’, and Article 52 – ‘General Protection of Civilian Objects’ of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (hereafter referred to as ‘AP I’), which concerns the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.[103]

The airstrike on the psychiatric hospital is probably also a violation of Article 18 of the Convention on the Protection of the Civilian Population (hereafter, ‘GC IV’)[104] and Article 12 – ‘Protection of medical formations’ of AP I. Both the perpetrators of this form of the Actus reus and their commanders (for giving the order to carry out the attack) can be held responsible for this crime.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols to them are international treaties, consent to the binding nature of which has been given by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 [105] and Additional Protocols І and ІІ[106] were ratified by relevant decrees of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and remain valid for Ukraine in accordance with Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine ‘on the Legal Succession of Ukraine’.[107]

State of armed conflict

GC IV and AP І apply ‘to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict that may arise between two or more High Contracting Parties, even if one of them does not recognise the state of war’.[108]

An international armed conflict exists ‘when there is use of force between states’,[109] regardless of whether the attacked party resists.[110]

Ukraine and the Russian Federation have been in a state of international armed conflict since 26 February 2014, at the latest —the first use of force by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The use of force in the course of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation beginning on 24 February 2022 likewise represents a situation of international armed conflict.

Qualification options

In the absence of testimony from the Russian air force pilots or other persons involved in the attacks, it is impossible to establish exactly what the purpose of the attack was. Therefore, for the present purposes, we will consider the version of events whereby the attack was aimed at the Mykolaiv Shipbuilding Plant (hereafter, the ‘MSP’). As an alternative, it is also possible to consider that the attacks were directed specifically at the hotel and hospital or at other objects.

At the same time, regardless of the goal set by the individuals involved in this attack, it bears signs of war crimes nonetheless. If the attack was directed at the MSP, which is not a military target, then this is a war crime – an attack on a civilian object. Even if the MSP is a military target, an attack with indiscriminate weapons is also a war crime. A direct, deliberate attack on a hospital is also classified as a war crime.

Attack on a civilian object

The probable trajectory of the attack and the impact of the bombs suggest that the attack could have been aimed at the MSP and the damage to the hotel and hospital was accidental. To assess the legality of the attack on the MSP, it is necessary to analyse whether the plant was a military objective as of 21 March 2022 – whether by its nature, location, purpose, or method of use it effectively contributed to the conduct of military operations and whether its destruction or neutralisation could provide a clear military advantage.

Article 48 of AP I enshrines the principle of distinction — one of the most important [111] principles of international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflicts):

 “To ensure the respect and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the parties to the conflict must always distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, as well as civilian and military objects, and accordingly direct their actions only against military objects.”

Article 49 of AP I defines attack as “violent actions against an adversary, whether offensive or defensive”.

Article 52 of AP I establishes:

1. Civilian objects should not be the object of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects are all those objects that are not military objectives as defined in Paragraph 2.

2. Attacks must be strictly limited to military targets. With regard to objects, military objectives are limited to those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or method of use, effectively contribute to the conduct of military operations and whose partial or complete destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances prevailing at a specific moment in time provides a clear military advantage.

3. In case of doubt as to whether an object ordinarily intended for civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a residential building or other residential structure, or a school, is not being used to effectively facilitate military operations, it shall be presumed that such an object is being used in civilian purposes.

The criteria for determining military objectives, enshrined in Article 52 (2) of AP I, are considered ‘widely accepted’[112] and those that have acquired the status of norms of customary international law.[113]

Despite its name, MSP did not have the facility to build new ships[114] and was used to repair ships, in particular, for the Naval Forces of Ukraine (hereafter referred to as ‘the navy’). In 2020, 12 ships were repaired at the MSP, of which nine were for the navy [115]; in 2021 — 5 ships for the navy[116]. However, since 2020, the plant has been undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.[117]

In the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, the navy lost a significant portion[118] of its ships, including its flagship the Hetman Sahaidachny,[119] and could make use of only ‘four or five patrol boats’.[120] Given that the original function and purpose of the MSP was ship repair, it is difficult to determine how exactly the plant, as of 21 March 2022 could effectively contribute to the conduct of military operations. Likewise, the assumption that the destruction or neutralisation of the MSP could give the Russian Federation a clear military advantage seems questionable. Such an advantage must be ‘concrete and tangible, not hypothetical and speculative’[121] – it ‘is illegal to carry out an attack that leads to only potential or uncertain advantages’.[122]

Therefore, on the basis of the available information, it can be concluded that the very attempt to attack the MSP, which was not a military target, bears signs of the objective aspect of the crime provided for in Part 1 of Article 438 of the CCU. These actions also fall under Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), when it comes to ‘intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects that are not military objectives’.

Use of weapons of indiscriminate action

Even assuming that the MSP was a legitimate military target, an attack on it using FAB-250 or FAB-500 (heavy unguided aerial bombs with a strike radius that could exceed 1,000 m)[123] exhibits signs of a war crime, namely a serious violation of Article 51 of AP I – ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ and Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC – ‘Deliberately committing an attack with the knowledge that such an attack […] will cause damage to civilian objects […]’.

Article 51(4) of AP I establishes:

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:

(a) those that are not aimed at a specific military goal;
(b) those that use methods or means of conducting military operations that cannot be aimed at a specific military goal; or
(c) those which employ methods or means of warfare, the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and which thus, in each such case, hit military targets and civilians or civilian objects without distinguishing between them.

Indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that target civilians or civilian objects and military targets indiscriminately, can also qualify as direct attacks on civilians. In this regard, it is possible to conclude a direct attack on civilians based on the indiscriminate nature of the weapons used.[124]

The attack was carried out against an object that was located in the centre of the city, next to civilian homes. At the same time, as of 21 March 2022, the Russian Army maintained a significant stockpile of high-precision weapons, such as Kalibr anti-aircraft missile systems, and, accordingly, could have uses them instead of FAB-250 or FAB-500.

Taking account of the numerous previous cases of the use of weapons of indiscriminate action by the Russian Federation in populated areas,[125] there are reasons to believe that the described events are further confirmation of a deliberate policy on the part of Russian army to use indiscriminate weapons, which is a war crime. In this case, it does not matter which objects were the targets of the attack; the fact of using an indiscriminate weapon is sufficient for qualification.

Attack on the hospital

In addition, it is necessary to consider a version of events whereby a deliberate attack was carried out on the psychiatric hospital.

Article 18 of GC IV establishes:

“Civilian hospitals, organised to provide assistance to the wounded, sick, disabled and women in labour, cannot under any circumstances be the object of attack, instead they will always enjoy the respect of the parties to the conflict and will be under their protection.”

According to Article 12 of AP I – ‘Protection of medical formations’:

1. Medical formations at any time enjoy respect and protection and cannot be the object of an attack.
2. Paragraph 1 applies to civil medical formations provided that they:
(a) belong to one of the parties to the conflict […].

Article 13 of AP I – ‘Termination of protection of civilian medical formations’:

The protection to which civilian medical formations are entitled ceases only if they are used, in addition to their humanitarian functions, to commit actions that harm the enemy. The provision of protection may, however, be terminated only after a warning with a reasonable time limit set in appropriate cases and after such warning has not been taken into account.

Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides that ‘intentionally directing attacks against […] hospitals and places of concentration of the sick and wounded, provided that they are not military objectives’, is a war crime.

Mykolaiv Regional Psychiatric Hospital № 1 is obviously a civil medical organisation within the meaning of Article 12 of AP I and a civil hospital within the meaning of Article 18 of GC IV. Even were it to be used in a manner that would cause harm to the enemy (of which no such facts have been established), an attack on it would be permitted only following a warning and would have to be proportionate.

Taking into account the fact that Russian Federation troops are systematically shelling medical facilities, particularly in Mykolaiv Oblast,[126] as well as the considerable distance between the MSP and the hospital (more than 800 m), there are reasons to believe that such an attack was intentional.

Accordingly, an attack on a hospital bears features of the crime provided for in Part 1 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. If it is established that the attack was intentional, then such an act would constitute a war crime in accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.

APPENDIX I

The complete list of personnel of the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the 559th Bombardment Regiment of the 1st Guards Mixed Aviation Division of the 4th Army of the Russian Air Force.

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2. https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B1%D1%8B_(%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F)

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4. Ibid.

5.Video recording showing the destruction on the grounds of the hospital on Volodarskoho Street, recording by Truth Hounds documenters with a drone on 20 May 2022.

6. A photo of the tear on the hospital grounds taken by Truth Hounds documenters.

7. Ibid.

8. Truth Hounds, ‘When there is no doubt that this is a war crime’, 5 March 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/save/https://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/dokazi-vikoristannya-rf-zbro%D1%97-nevibirkovo%D1%97-di%D1%97-v-naselenih-punktah-1.pdf, accessed 2 February 2023.

9. Ibid.

10. Video recording of the destruction of the Inhul Hotel taken on 20 May 2022 by Truth Hounds documenters using a drone.

11. A photo of the destroyed facade of the Inhul Hotel taken by Truth Hounds documenters.

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46. Defence UA, ‘Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the occupied Crimea will “switch” to modernized Ka-27M’, 16 July 2022,  available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230206080627/https://defence-ua.com/army_and_war/aviatsija_chornomorskogo_flotu_rf_v_okupovanomu_krimu_peresjade_na_modernizovani_ka_27m-4236.html, accessed 4 February 2023.

47. Ukrinform, ‘Ukraine showed the OSCE satellite images of airfields in occupied Crimea.’, 23 June 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230206081316/https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/3269352-ukraina-pokazala-v-obse-suputnikovi-znimki-aerodromiv-v-okupovanomu-krimu.html, accessed 4 February 2023.

48. Bmpd Livejournal, ‘The 37th mixed aviation regiment of the 27th aviation division was supposedly created in Gvardeyskoye in Crimea.’, 12 January 2014, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230206082134/https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1079234.html, accessed 4 February 2023; Suspilne, ‘Russia is transferring aircraft from the front-line areas deep into Crimea and into the territory of the Russian Federation – intelligence’, 17 August 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220817172854/https://suspilne.media/272281-rosia-perekidae-aviaciu-z-prifrontovih-zon-vglib-krimu-ta-na-teritoriu-rf-rozvidka/, accessed 30 January 2023.

49. UNIAN, ‘The key airfield of the Russian aviation: what is known about the base in Crimea, where the explosions rang out’, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230206083219/https://www.unian.ua/war/klyuchoviy-aerodrom-aviaciji-rf-shcho-vidomo-pro-bazu-v-krimu-u-yakiy-lunali-vibuhi-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11935386.html, accessed 4 February 2023.

50. Satellite image of the Saki airfield from 16 March 2022 published by Planet SkySat.

51. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, ‘Super-maneuverable multifunctional fighter Su-30SM’, available at: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/air/weapons/aviation/more.htm?id=12103277@morfMilitaryModel

52. Interfax-Ukraine YouTube channel, ‘Press conference of prisoners of war pilots of the Russian army’, 11 March 2022, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W7UpswG_WrE, accessed 25 January 2023.

53. Ibid (27:02).

54. Ibid (14:07).

55. Facty, ‘“Tochka-U” hit the Russian military airfield: what is known’, 25 February 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220227085535/https://crime.fakty.ua/397166-quot-tochka-u-quot-nanesla-udar-po-rossijskomu-voennomu-aerodromu-chto-izvestno, accessed 4 February 2023.

56. Taganrog-avia, ‘Taganrog-Central Airfield’, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230206084235/https://taganrog-avia.ru/aeroclub/Taganrog-Centr/Taganrog-Centr.html2023, accessed 4 February 2023.

57. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘In the Southern Military District, army aviation bases are transformed into helicopter brigades and regiments’, 12 March 2015, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230206084601/https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12070839@egNews , accessed 4 February 2023.

58. Armyinform, ‘Map of 40 airfields from which Russia carries out air strikes on Ukraine’, 21 March 2022, available at:  https://web.archive.org/save/https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/21/karta-40-aerodromiv-z-yakyh-rosiya-zdijsnyuye-aviaudary-po-ukrayini/, accessed 25 January 2023.

59. Militarnyi, ‘Russian strike aircraft in Crimea and on the border with Ukraine’, 12 May 2018, available at:  https://web.archive.org/web/20230206085202/https://mil.in.ua/uk/rosijska-udarna-aviatsiya-v-krymu-ta-na-kordoni-z-ukrayinoyu/, accessed 4 February 2023.

60. Ibid.

61. Live Universal Awareness Map as of 21 March 2022, available at: https://liveuamap.com/uk/time/20.03.2022.

62. Djoker YouTube channel, ‘Su-34 for the 559th bap (Morozovsk)’, 10 June 2014, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pa-u2ChSoc0, accessed 25 January 2023; Bloknot, ‘The air base in Morozovsk has become the largest operator of Su-34 front-line bombers in Russia’, 24 January 2016, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20191123223956/http://bloknot-volgodonsk.ru/news/aviabaza-v-morozovske-stala-krupneyshim-ekspluatan-695398, accessed 25 January 2023.

63. Censor.net, ‘The names of the Russian pilots who are bombing Kharkiv have become known. LIST’, 6 March 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230125234634/https://censor.net/ua/news/3322271/staly_vidomi_imena_rosiyiskyh_lotchykiv_yaki_bombarduyut_harkiv_perelik, accessed 25 January 2023; The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘War criminals – servicemen of the 559th bomber aviation regiment (military unit 75392) of Morozovsk, Rostov region, carrying out bomb attacks on peaceful citizens and cities of Ukraine’, 19 March 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230209123933/https://gur.gov.ua/content/voennosluzhashchye-559-bombardyrovochnoho-avyatsyonnoho-polka.html, accessed 25 January 2023.

64. Morozovsk Airfield, Rostov Oblast, 21 March 2022. The central part of the airfield.

65. Morozovsk Airport, Rostov Region, March 21, 2022. The eastern part of the airfield.

66. Morozovsk Airport, Rostov Region, March 21, 2022. The north-western part of the airfield.

67.https://web.archive.org/web/20220818044535/https://t.me/DIUkraine/1118.

68. Unian, ‘Who is bombing Kharkiv’, 7 March 2022, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230125235120/https://www.unian.ua/war/hto-bombit-harkiv-opublikovano-imena-rosiyskih-lotchikiv-spisok-novini-harkova-11731954.html, accessed 25 January 2023; https://enigma.ua/articles/kto-ubivaet-ukraintsev-identifikatsiya-rossiyskikh-pilotov-kotorye-mogut-bombit-nashi-goroda

69. InformNapalm, ‘Syria: the data of the pilots of the 960th assault aviation regiment of the Russian Air Force has been established’, 16 November 2015, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230125235500/https://informnapalm.org/15154-960-shap/, accessed 25 January 2023.

70. New Kuban, ‘In the Krasnodar region, a bomber flight over a beach with tourists was caught on video’, 21 June 2022, available at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20230125235731/https://newkuban.ru/news/210655314/, accessed 25 January 2023.

71. Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai, 13 February 2022.

72. Armyinform, ‘Map of 40 airfields from which Russia carries out air strikes on Ukraine’, 21 March 2022, available at:  https://web.archive.org/save/https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/21/karta-40-aerodromiv-z-yakyh-rosiya-zdijsnyuye-aviaudary-po-ukrayini/, accessed 25 January 2023.

73. Primorsko-Akhtarsk Airfield, Krasnodar Krai. Nine Su-34 aircraft. Photo from 6 April 2022.

74. Military Industry, ‘Fortress Crimea’, 23 March 2015, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20200125123229/https://vpk-news.ru/articles/24412, accessed 25 January 2023; Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, ‘The militarization of the temporarily occupied Crimea by the Russian Federation continues’, 30 November 2018, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20200125004623/https://mtot.gov.ua/militaryzatsiya-rosijskoyu-federatsiyeyu-tymchasovo-okupovanogo-krymu-prodovzhuyetsya, accessed 25 January 2023.

75. Suspilne, ‘Russia transfers aircraft from the front-line areas deep into Crimea and into the territory of the Russian Federation – intelligence’, 17 August 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220817172854/https://suspilne.media/272281-rosia-perekidae-aviaciu-z-prifrontovih-zon-vglib-krimu-ta-na-teritoriu-rf-rozvidka/, accessed 30 January 2023.

76. Ibid.

77. Radio Svoboda, ‘Declassified. How does Ukraine monitor Russia in Crimea from space?’, 2 July 2021, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230131232744/https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/crimea-space-russia-map/31088090.html, accessed 30 January 2023.

78. Photograph of Belbek Airfield from 6 March 2022.

79. A photograph of Belbek Airfield from around 13:30 EET on 21 March 2022. At least six Su-34.

80. Zvezda TV, ‘The roar of jet engines: how the Air Force’s aviation duty in special operations in Ukraine is going’, 15 March 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230131231300/https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2022315932-xSQAi.html, accessed 30 January 2023.

81. Photograph of Belbek Airfield from 23 March 2022 showing at least four Su-34s.

82. Photograph of Belbek Airfield from 23 March 2022 showing at least three Su-34s.

83. Photograph of Belbek Airfield dated 23 March 2022, showing at least one Su-34.

84. Photograph of Belbek Airfield from 23 March 2022 showing at least three Su-34s.

85. Photograph of Belbek Airfield dated 23 March 2022, showing at least one Su-34.

86. https://enigma.ua/articles/kto-ubivaet-ukraintsev-identifikatsiya-rossiyskikh-pilotov-kotorye-mogut-bombit-nashi-goroda

87. https://vk.com/video/@id86075299?z=video-151878956_456253465%2Fpl_86075299_-2

88. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/3269352-ukraina-pokazala-v-obse-suputnikovi-znimki-aerodromiv-v-okupovanomu-krimu.html.

89. Suspilne, ‘Russia transfers aircraft from the front-line areas deep into Crimea and into the territory of the Russian Federation – intelligence’, 17 August 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220817172854/https://suspilne.media/272281-rosia-perekidae-aviaciu-z-prifrontovih-zon-vglib-krimu-ta-na-teritoriu-rf-rozvidka/, accessed 30 January 2023.

90. https://archive.md/KsASL#selection-6547.0-6559.388.

91. https://informnapalm.org/ua/pks-rf-pro-komandyra-559-go-aviapolku/; https://archive.is/42lIO.

92. https://archive.is/42lIO.

93. https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/10/151008_russia_syria_what_do_we_know; https://army-news.ru/2018/08/mnogocelevoj-boevoj-samolet-pokoleniya-iv-su-34-chast-5/.

94. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0dcylYwPnY.

95. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0dcylYwPnY.

96. https://informnapalm.org/ua/hto-bombyt-tsyvilnyh-u-syriyi/; https://topwar.ru/150216-su-34-boevoe-primenenie-v-gruzii-i-sirii.htmlhttps://gur.gov.ua/content/voennosluzhashchye-559-bombardyrovochnoho-avyatsyonnoho-polka.html.

97. https://informnapalm.org/ua/pks-rf-pro-komandyra-559-go-aviapolku/.

98. https://informnapalm.org/ua/hto-bombyt-tsyvilnyh-u-syriyi/.

99. Glavkom, ‘The occupiers dropped bombs on a hospital, a hotel and a park in Mykolaiv’, 21 March 2022, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20230202193731/https://glavcom.ua/country/incidents/okupanti-skinuli-bombi-na-likarnyu-gotel-i-park-u-mikolajevi-831824.html, accessed 1 February 2023.

100. https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/12/26/glava-mzs-ukrayiny-u-mykolayevi-my-budemo-vezty-novu-zbroyu-ta-zaganyaty-rosiyan-v-izolyacziyu/; https://phm.gov.ua/?p=140503.

101. The location of the hotel and the hospital in relation to the shipyard.

102. State service for Geodesy, Cartography, and Cadastre, ‘Public cadastral map’, available at:: https://kadastr.live/#14.91/46.97571/32.00906.

103. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_199#Text

104. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_154#Text.

105. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/114а-03#Text.

106. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/7960-11#Text.

107. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1543-12#Text.

108. Article 2, GC IV; Article 1(2) AP І.

109. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ‘The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A’, 2 October 1995, para. 70.

110. H.P. Gasser (1993), ‘International Humanitarian Law: an Introduction’, Humanity for All: the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, H. Haug (ed.), Paul Haupt Publishers, Berne, pp. 510- 511.

111. Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, I.C.J. Reports 226, 257 (July 8); https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/distinction; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule7.

112. ICTY, ‘The Prosecutor v. Stanilav Galić, Judgment’, 5 December 2003, para. 51.

113. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s Claim, ‘Partial Award’, 19 December 2005, para. 113.

114. http://shipbuilding.mk.ua/?p=4853.

115. https://shipbuilding.mk.ua/?p=3797.

116. https://shipbuilding.mk.ua/?p=4811.

117. https://defence-ua.com/news/sud_pochav_rozgljad_spravi_pro_bankrutstvo_dp_mikolajivskij_sudnobudivnij_zavod-3430.html;

https://youcontrol.com.ua/catalog/company_details/14313240/.

118. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-naval-losses-during-2022.html.

119. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44563/the-ukrainian-navys-flagship-appears-to-have-been-scuttled.

120. https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/relative-dominance-russian-naval-power-in-the-black-sea/.

121. Waldemar Solf, ‘Article 52’, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 326.

122. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmerman (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 2024.

123. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), ‘Isayeva v. Russia, Judgment (App. no. 57950/00)’, 24 February 2005, para. 165.

124. ICTY, ‘The Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Judgment’, 12 June 2007, para. 69.

125. https://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/dokazi-vikoristannya-rf-zbroї-nevibirkovoї-diї-v-naselenih-punktah-1.pdf.

126. https://bihus.info/medyczyna-pid-obstrilamy-yak-rosijski-vijska-nyshhat-likuvalni-zaklady-mykolayivshhyny/.